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vaccination when a vaccine becomes available. Method: A national probability survey of US adults (N = 
1050) was conducted in the latter half of March 2020 and a follow-up with 840 of the same individuals in 
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vaccines, political ideology, and media exposure patterns. Results: Belief in three COVID-19-related 
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threat of the pandemic, (b) taking of preventive actions, including wearing a face mask, (c) perceived 
safety of vaccination, and (d) intention to be vaccinated against COVID-19. Conspiracy beliefs in March 
predicted subsequent mask-wearing and vaccination intentions in July even after controlling for action 
taken and intentions in March. Although adopting preventive behaviors was predicted by political ideology 
and conservative media reliance, vaccination intentions were less related to political ideology. 
Mainstream television news use predicted adopting both preventive actions and vaccination. 
Conclusions: Because belief in COVID-related conspiracy theories predicts resistance to both preventive 
behaviors and future vaccination for the virus, it will be critical to confront both conspiracy theories and 
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A B S T R A C T   
Rationale: The COVID-19 pandemic poses extraordinary challenges to public health. 
Objective: Because the novel coronavirus is highly contagious, the widespread use of preventive measures such as 
masking, physical distancing, and eventually vaccination is needed to bring it under control. We hypothesized 
that accepting conspiracy theories that were circulating in mainstream and social media early in the COVID-19 
pandemic in the US would be negatively related to the uptake of preventive behaviors and also of vaccination 
when a vaccine becomes available. 
Method: A national probability survey of US adults (N = 1050) was conducted in the latter half of March 2020 
and a follow-up with 840 of the same individuals in July 2020. The surveys assessed adoption of preventive 
measures recommended by public health authorities, vaccination intentions, conspiracy beliefs, perceptions of 
threat, belief about the safety of vaccines, political ideology, and media exposure patterns. 
Results: Belief in three COVID-19-related conspiracy theories was highly stable across the two periods and 
inversely related to the (a) perceived threat of the pandemic, (b) taking of preventive actions, including wearing 
a face mask, (c) perceived safety of vaccination, and (d) intention to be vaccinated against COVID-19. Conspiracy 
beliefs in March predicted subsequent mask-wearing and vaccination intentions in July even after controlling for 
action taken and intentions in March. Although adopting preventive behaviors was predicted by political ide-
ology and conservative media reliance, vaccination intentions were less related to political ideology. Mainstream 
television news use predicted adopting both preventive actions and vaccination. 
Conclusions: Because belief in COVID-related conspiracy theories predicts resistance to both preventive behaviors 
and future vaccination for the virus, it will be critical to confront both conspiracy theories and vaccination 
misinformation to prevent further spread of the virus in the US. Reducing those barriers will require continued 
messaging by public health authorities on mainstream media and in particular on politically conservative outlets 
that have supported COVID-related conspiracy theories.   
1. Introduction 
Because it is highly contagious, controlling the spread of the novel 
coronavirus COVID-19 requires widescale public adoption of preventive 
behaviors (Sanche et al., 2020). Understanding the factors that predict 
the public’s willingness to engage in them is required to control the 
infection. Still, some national leaders have expressed doubt about the 
potential seriousness of the pandemic. On March 9th, one member of 
Congress ridiculed the idea that drastic measures were needed by 
wearing a gas mask to a vote to approve emergency funding for the 
pandemic (Cummings, 2020). The President also famously stated that 
the pandemic would be less harmful than the seasonal flu (Montanaro, 
2020). At the same time, several popular conservative media hosts and 
commentators expressed doubts about COVID-19’s seriousness and 
lethality (Jamieson and Albarracín, 2020; Motta et al., 2020). 
The inconsistency between public health messaging and that 
emanating from some prominent media personalities and political 
leaders made it difficult for the health community to satisfy a key 
precondition of public preventive behavior—communicate a consensus 
that such action is needed (World Health Organization, 2008). In earlier 
epidemics (Singer et al., 2020), when political leaders of one party failed 
to endorse health recommendations to combat the threat, the public 
response divided along partisan lines. Similar patterns have unfolded in 
the COVID-19 pandemic (Allcott et al., 2020; Pew Research Center, 
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2020). 
Complicating matters further, belief in conspiracy theories that 
attributed a socially significant event, in this case the novel coronavirus, 
to unknown and sinister actors (Douglas et al., 2019), were circulating 
within social and traditional media (Funke, 2020; Infotagion, 2020; Lee, 
2020). Conspiracy beliefs are likely to undermine the motivation to take 
action in the current pandemic, in part because they are difficult to rebut 
(Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Uscinski et al., 2016). Also, belief in any one 
of them is likely to be associated with belief in others, suggesting that 
some persons are more susceptible to such beliefs regardless of their 
content (Douglas et al., 2019). In addition, some conspiracy beliefs have 
been associated with unsubstantiated fears of vaccination and unwill-
ingness to vaccinate (Hornsey et al., 2020; Jolley and Douglas, 2014). 
This finding could be especially problematic because vaccinating a high 
proportion of those susceptible to the coronavirus is one of the surest 
means of controlling it (Greenwood, 2014). If conspiracy beliefs are 
associated with mistaken fears about the nature or effects of vaccination, 
their circulation could undermine the country’s ability to bring 
COVID-19 to heel. 
1.1. The current study 
As the numbers of deaths from COVID-19 continued to rise, we 
conducted two surveys with a panel of US adults, the first in late March 
after national recommendations for preventive action were released, but 
before mask-wearing was advised, and the second in July after total 
statewide lockdowns had been lifted. These surveys were informed by a 
prior national survey conducted early in March 2020 (Jamieson and 
Albarracín, 2020) that documented belief that: 1) The CDC exaggerated 
the danger posed by the virus to hurt President Trump (19% saying 
probably or definitely true); 2) the US government created the virus 
(10%); and 3) the Chinese government created the virus (23%). Like 
ours, that research found that these beliefs were associated with the use 
of social media (e.g., Facebook) and conservative media (e.g., Fox News, 
Rush Limbaugh, and Breitbart). While that study confirmed that 
discernible proportions of the public reported belief in two of these 
three, it did not assess whether such beliefs are related to the public’s 
willingness to engage in protective action for the pandemic (Jamieson 
and Albarracín, 2020). Although other work has suggested that 
COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs hindered the adoption of some preventive 
behaviors (Barua et al., 2020; Imhoff and Lamberty, 2020), their reli-
ance on small cross-sectional convenience samples limits their inter-
pretation and generalizability. 
Examining conspiracy beliefs within the same sample after a four- 
month interval makes it possible to determine: the stability of such be-
liefs; whether those assessed in Wave 1 were negatively associated with 
preventive behaviors including intention to vaccinate; and whether the 
beliefs were predictive of subsequent recommended action to prevent 
the spread of the infection, namely mask-wearing (Howard et al., 2020), 
as well as to intentions to vaccinate when a vaccine becomes available. 
Based on research indicating the difficulty of correcting conspiratorial 
beliefs (Jolley and Douglas, 2017; Uscinski et al., 2016), we expected 
that conspiracy beliefs early in the pandemic would not only remain 
stable but also would predict subsequent preventive actions and vacci-
nation intentions. 
Theories of health behavior suggest that threats to the individual and 
the community can motivate action (Rogers, 1983; Strecher and 
Rosenstock, 1997). Still, conspiracy beliefs tend to downplay the threat 
or suggest other means of confronting it. Thus, we hypothesized that 
conspiracy beliefs would be inversely related to the perceived threat of 
the pandemic and that any inverse relation with taking action or 
accepting a vaccine would be mediated by reduced perceptions of threat. 
Previous research has linked conspiracy beliefs with vaccination 
hesitancy (Hornsey et al., 2020; Jolley and Douglas, 2014). There are at 
least two paths that could account for that link. One is through reduced 
perception of the threat and the other through concerns about the safety 
of vaccines (Jolley and Douglas, 2017). The latter path would add to the 
challenge of encouraging adoption of this important prevention strat-
egy. Thus, we also assessed a common misperception about the safety of 
vaccines, and in particular the measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) 
vaccine for children (Kata, 2010). We hypothesized that belief in COVID 
conspiracies would be positively related to perceptions of the harm of 
the MMR vaccine and would partially mediate any inverse relationship 
with intention to vaccinate. 
Because taking preventive action appeared to have polarized on 
partisan grounds, we assessed respondents’ political ideology on the 
assumption that it could be related to both conspiracy beliefs and taking 
action apart from those beliefs. Building on earlier work (Jamieson and 
Albarracín, 2020; Motta et al., 2020; Romano, 2020), we also examined 
whether some patterns of media use were associated with acceptance of 
COVID-related conspiracies. Consistent with prior research, we expected 
that reliance on mainstream television news such as NBC news and the 
national print media such as the New York Times would correlate with 
higher levels of concern about the pandemic and behaviors to prevent its 
spread. At the same time, use of conservative media such as FOX News or 
social media was expected to co-vary with holding conspiracy beliefs 
(Jamieson and Albarracín, 2020; Motta et al., 2020; Romano, 2020). 
Because misinformed beliefs are resistant to correction (Chan et al., 
2017), beliefs in March would be expected to predict changes in pre-
ventive intentions and behavior in July. 
To address these questions, we employed a path model that 
encompassed the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and reported 
preventive behaviors and willingness to vaccinate against COVID-19. As 
Figs. 1 and 2 show, the model tested the hypothesis that conspiracy 
beliefs were inversely related to both, not only directly but indirectly by 
way of perceptions of the seriousness of the pandemic to the country and 
the respondents themselves. In the case of vaccination (Fig. 2), we 
included perceived harms of the MMR vaccine as an additional mediator 
of the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and intentions to accept 
vaccination. Finally, we tested whether conspiracy beliefs predict 
change in either action taken or vaccination intention over the four 
months between the two survey waves. 
In drawing conclusions about the potential causal role of conspiracy 
beliefs, it was important to control for the demographic profile of re-
spondents who might be susceptible to conspiracy beliefs. Based on 
research showing that people of lower socioeconomic status are more likely 
to hold conspiracy beliefs (Douglas et al., 2019; Uscinski and Parent, 2014), 
it is possible that persons with less education, income, and from tradi-
tionally disadvantaged communities, such as racial and ethnic minorities, 
would be more accepting of COVID-related conspiracy beliefs. The model 
examined these as predictors of conspiracy beliefs along with other de-
mographic differences and controlled for them as potential third-variable 
explanations of relations between conspiracy beliefs and our outcomes. 
2. Method 
2.1. Survey sample 
A national probability-based survey of the US population with 1050 
respondents was conducted between March 17 and 27, 2020 (Wave 1). 
The sample was recruited by Qualtrics from the NORC AmeriSpeak 
Panel (National Opinion Research Center, 2020). To represent the US 
population, panel selection was determined in part by the likelihood to 
respond across 48 demographic strata. Wave 2 was collected between 
July 10 and 21 by inviting the same panel members to take the second 
survey. We were able to retain 840 (80%) participants in Wave 2. As 
seen in Table 1, the demographic profile in Wave 2 was virtually iden-
tical to Wave 1. Additionally, those who dropped out did not differ from 
those who remained in any of our dependent variables in Wave 1, except 
for a small relation between missingness and intention to vaccinate, r =
− 0.08. As a result, we confined our analyses to those who participated in 
both waves. 
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NORC also provided demographic sample weights to enable pro-
jections to national responses according to age, gender, race-ethnicity, 
education, and Census Division based on the Current Population Sur-
vey of February 2020. We used those weights in descriptive summaries 
of the sample (see Tables 1 and 3). All multivariate analyses were con-
ducted with unweighted data and demographic differences controlled. 
2.2. Survey content 
In both waves, we asked whether the respondent had recently taken 
any of 9 steps “to protect yourself from getting the coronavirus (COVID- 
19).” The sum of the number reported was used as an index of taking 
action to prevent the further spread of COVID-19. As seen in Table 2, 
only 1.3% failed to take any action. The most frequent action was 
“washed hands or used a hand sanitizer” (92.5%). Although we included 
wearing a mask as an option, CDC did not recommend this option until 
April 3, after evidence of asymptomatic transmission for COVID-19 
emerged (CDC, 2020a) and after we completed the first survey. Also, 
testing for the virus was largely unavailable during the period of the 
survey. Therefore, we did not include either testing or mask-wearing in 
our analysis at time one. 
Because various states implemented lockdowns on different dates 
during Wave 1, we examined the relation between date of the interview 
and our index of taking action. We found no relationship between the 
two. 
In Wave 2, we also asked whether facial masks had been worn in the 
past few days “when you go to public places where you might encounter 
other people”, with “never, some days, and every day” as the response 
options. For this outcome, 79% claimed to wear a mask every day. 
Because we did not have a useful measure of this behavior in Wave 1, we 
used the measure of the number of actions taken as a proxy for the 
willingness to adopt a new preventive behavior. Consistent with this 
expectation, the number of actions taken was correlated with mask- 
wearing in Wave 2 (r = 0.23), indicating that it could serve this purpose. 
We asked respondents “If there were a vaccine that protected you 
from getting the coronavirus, how likely, if at all, would you be to decide 
to be vaccinated?” Responses were recorded on a 4-point scale from “Not 
at all likely” to “Very likely”. At Wave 1, only 59.6% said they were very 
likely to be vaccinated; while 14.5% said they were either not at all or 
not too likely to be vaccinated. The corresponding proportion who 
claimed they were unlikely to be vaccinated increased to 25.8% at Wave 
2, a trend in line with other national surveys (Elflein, 2020; Romano, 
2020). Nevertheless, vaccination intentions were positively correlated 
over time, r = 0.63. 
Perceived threat to the country was measured by asking whether the 
pandemic was a more serious threat to the country than (a) illegal 
immigration, (b) hurricanes and other natural disasters, or (c) terrorism, 
with responses recorded on an agree (1) to disagree scale (6). Since 
responses to these items correlated (α = 0.84), we created a national 
threat index based on the mean responses to them. 
Perceived threat to the individual was measured with an item that 
assessed worry that the virus would infect the respondent or someone in 
the respondent’s family: “How worried, if at all, do you feel about the 
possibility that you or someone in your family will become infected with 
the coronavirus?”. Responses ranged from “Not at all worried” to “Very 
worried” on a 4-point scale. This item was highly correlated with the 
Fig. 1. Path model showing standardized relations between predictors in March and outcomes at both time points for taking action. Darker paths have confidence 
intervals of p ± .005, while lighter ones are at p ± .025. Dashed paths are indicate inverse relations. 
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respondents’ perceived susceptibility to the infection (r = 0.48) and 
severity of the illness (r = 0.30), factors that are related to taking pre-
ventative action according to health protection theories (Rogers, 1983; 
Strecher and Rosenstock, 1997). The percentage who claimed to be very 
worried declined slightly from Wave 1 to 2 (24.8–21.1, respectively) and 
remained stable at the individual level, r = 0.50. 
We assessed belief in three conspiracy theories that either minimized 
its importance or blamed it on actors presumed to have malicious intent: 
(a) “The pharmaceutical industry created the coronavirus to increase 
sales of its drugs and vaccines; ” (b) “The coronavirus was created by the 
Chinese government as a biological weapon; ” or (c) “Some in the U.S. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, also known as CDC, are 
exaggerating the danger posed by the coronavirus to damage the Trump 
presidency.” Belief in these statements was registered from “Definitely 
false” to “Definitely true” on a 4-point scale. Since beliefs in these con-
spiracies were inter-related, we created an index based on the mean of 
the items (α = 0.72). The mean (SD) of the index increased slightly from 
Wave 1 to 2 (1.75 (0.85) vs. 1.90 (1.08), respectively) and the beliefs 
were positively correlated over time, r = 0.75. 
We queried belief in the harms of vaccines with the following item: 
“How likely do you think it is that vaccines given to children for diseases 
like measles, mumps, and rubella can cause neurological disorders like 
autism?” Responses were recorded on a 4-point scale ranging from “Not 
very likely” to “Very likely.” Consistent with the hypothesis that con-
spiracy beliefs regarding the COVID-19 crisis will also underlie a wide 
range of health issues, the belief that vaccines are harmful was also 
correlated with the conspiracy index, r = 0.48. 
We assessed political ideology by asking: “Generally speaking, would 
you describe your political views as:” with response options on a 5-point 
scale from “very liberal” to “very conservative”. Media use was assessed 
to cover the political spectrum, from liberal outlets (e.g., MSNBC and the 
Huffington Post), mainstream TV (e.g., ABC, CNN) and mainstream print 
(NY Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal), to conservative 
media (e.g., Fox News and Rush Limbaugh). Also, we assessed use of 
news aggregators (e.g., Google News) and social media (e.g., Facebook). 
For each type of media, respondents rated how much information they 
got “from such sources as…” on a 5-point scale from “No information” 
(0) to “A lot of information” (5). (See Appendix for the wording of these 
news items.) 
2.3. Analytic strategy 
We used the structural equation program Mplus (Muthen and 
Muthen, 1998-2017) to model the predicted paths between conspiracy 
beliefs and both preventive actions taken and vaccination intention. This 
strategy allowed us to test mediation and to separate relations between 
conspiracy beliefs and outcomes that were stable over time versus those 
that emerged following Wave 1. A power analysis using a Monte Carlo 
procedure in Mplus (Muthen and Muthen, 2002) determined that a 
sample size of 800 would provide sufficient power to detect a mediated 
standardized relation of 0.04 or larger with a 95% confidence interval 
(CI). Therefore, we anticipated that a sample size of 1050 would give us 
enough power if we achieved the expected 75% participation in Wave 2. 
We restricted the analysis to the 840 respondents who participated in 
both waves. Approximately 2.6% of the cases had missing data for one or 
more items, and these cases were also omitted in the Mplus models. 
Standard goodness of fit measures were used to assess model fit (Bollen 
and Davis, 2009). We used bootstrapping procedures (with samples of 
1000) provided by Mplus to estimate confidence intervals for all pre-
dictors in the models. Other analyses were conducted using SPSS version 
26. 
Fig. 2. Path model showing standardized relations between predictors in March and vaccine intentions at both time points. Darker paths have confidence intervals of 
p ± .005, while lighter ones are at p ± .025. Dashed paths represent inverse relations. 
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3. Results 
Table 3 displays the demographic and media reliance of the sample 
and proportions of the weighted sample that reported that each of the 
three conspiracy theories was either definitely or probably true. High 
proportions reported belief in the conspiracies, ranging from a low of 
14.8% for the pharmaceutical industry having created the virus to a high 
of 28.3% believing that the Chinese government created the virus as a 
bioweapon. Different patterns of media were associated with belief in 
the theories. In particular, heavy users of conservative and social media 
tended to assign greater credibility to those beliefs. Finally, various 
demographic characteristics (age, education, income, and racial-ethnic 
identity) were related to conspiracy beliefs. 
The path model (Fig. 1) found that action taken in March was related 
to conspiracy beliefs both directly and indirectly through perceived 
threat to the individual and the nation. The relation between personal 
threat and action remained despite the confounding relation with male 
identity, which was also negatively related to both. Importantly, con-
spiracy beliefs in March predicted action (mask-wearing) in July both 
directly [-0.08, 99% CI (− 0.195, − 0.002)] and indirectly through 
perceived national threat [-0.24 × 0.22 = − 0.05, 99% CI (− 0.091, 
− 0.025)]. Conspiracy beliefs also predicted subsequent mask-wearing 
through its relationship with action in March, resulting in a total 
Table 1 
Demographic characteristics of both waves.  


















in Raw Ns 
Gender 
Male 486 45.6 401 44.3 .54 
Female 558 54.4 435 55.4  
Age 
18–29 131 20.7 104 20.5 .97 
30–44 313 24.1 245 23.9  
45–59 249 25.2 197 24.9  
60+ 357 30.0 294 30.7  
Race/Ethnicity 
White 807 73.0 655 74.2 .66 
Black 121 13.9 96 12.8  




216 32.6 168 32.6 .78 
Some College 625 47.8 514 48.3  
Post- 
Graduate 
206 19.6 157 30.1  
Income 
<$30K 244 26.4 198 26.8 .84 
$30 to $85 460 41.9 357 40.9  
$85 to 
>$200K 
346 31.7 285 32.3  
Political ideology 
Conservative 289 29.6 238 29.6 .85 
Neither 435 41.4 340 40.3  
Liberal 304 28.9 251 30.1  
News Source 
Mainstream TV 
None 141 14.0 110 13.4 .98 
Some 472 43.1 378 44.1  
A lot 423 41.7 340 42.5  
Mainstream print 
None 321 32.8 254 34.0 .98 
Some 471 44.9 380 44.8  
A lot 242 20.8 194 21.2  
Social 
None 338 31.5 279 32.6 .80 
Some 502 47.7 404 47.8  
A lot 199 19.7 150 19.6  
Aggregators 
None 267 25.1 210 25.2 .97 
Some 557 54.0 447 53.7  
A lot 217 19.9 176 21.1  
Conservative 
None 535 48.9 437 50.6 .92 
Some 334 31.4 262 31.1  
A lot 166 18.0 131 18.3  
Liberal 
None 447 42.9 351 43.2 .92 
Some 457 44.6 372 45.7  
A lot 132 11.1 108 11.1  
Note. Differences in raw distributions were determined using χ2-Square tests. 
Table 2 






% of all Actions 
Taken 
Washed hands or used a 
sanitizer 
92.9 0 1.3 
Kept distance from others 84.4 1 3.7 
Avoided gatherings >10 
people 
82.4 2 3.2 
Stayed at home 80.5 3 3.8 
Covered nose & mouth 
when coughing 
74.4 4 9.8 
Avoided contact with sick 
people 
69.8 5 16.0 
Avoided touching face 67.2 6 23.5 
Wore a face mask 10.2 7 38.8 
Got tested for the virus 0.7   
Did nothing 1.3   
Note. Number of actions taken is the sum across all 7 included in the index and 
the percentage is the distribution of those sums. 
Table 3 
Percentages of sample believing in conspiracy beliefs by demographic charac-
teristics and news use in March 2020 (N = 840).  
Characteristic % of Sample Pharma CDC Chinese 
Gender 
Male 44.1 9.6 27.0 29.1 
Female 55.6 19.1 20.3 27.8 
Age 
18–29 20.7 26.9 22.7 35.1 
30–44 23.8 21.9 30.1 29.8 
45–59 24.5 10.9 25.1 30.3 
60+ 31.0 4.3 17.1 22.3 
Race/Ethnicity 
White 74.7 9.7 22.3 25.5 
Black 13.9 36.3 31.4 43.8 
Hispanic 15.4 29.1 28.6 33.8 
Education 
High school or less 32.9 27.0 31.8 42.7 
Some College 48.2 12.1 21.7 24.0 
Post-Graduate 19.0 6.9 12.1 12.7 
Income 
<$30K 26.4 27.4 27.2 37.0 
$30 to $85 41.1 13.7 21.5 28.5 
$85 to >$200K 32.4 5.6 22.5 21.4 
Political ideology 
Conservative 29.8 11.1 40.2 37.1 
Neither 40.0 16.4 22.6 30.6 
Liberal 30.2 16.2 8.0 17.4 
News Source 
Mainstream TV 41.9 13.3 15.1 24.7 
Conservative 18.1 13.4 33.5 51.6 
Liberal 11.1 19.6 11.0 21.8 
Aggregators 20.9 24.2 25.0 32.2 
Social 19.6 19.8 28.6 41.8 
Mainstream print 21.0 15.0 13.2 18.4 
Total 100 14.8 23.5 28.3 
Note. Pharma = Pharmaceutical industry responsible; CDC = Damages Trump; 
Chinese = Created virus. Bolded proportions are for response distributions that 
are significantly different (p < .05) either across demographic groups or within 
each media use. 
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relation of − .16, 99% CI (− 0.26, − 0.07). Thus, the relationship between 
conspiracy beliefs and action taken in July was more than 5 times 
greater than what was attributable to those beliefs in March, going from 
− 0.03 to − 0.16. Mask wearing was also predicted by increasing age, use 
of mainstream TV, and liberal political ideology, each of which was also 
related to components of the model for preventive action in March. 
Notably, mainstream TV was negatively related to conspiracy beliefs 
and positively to both types of threat. 
There also were relations between other kinds of media sources and 
components of the model in March (see Table 4). Conservative and so-
cial media use were positively related to belief in conspiracy theories, 
whereas mainstream print was inversely related to conspiracy beliefs as 
were education, income, and White racial identity. Also, mainstream 
print and the aggregators were positively related to personal threat. All 
of the media relations remained after controlling for demographic dif-
ferences, and particularly political ideology, which was strongly corre-
lated with the use of conservative media (r = − 0.42) and somewhat less 
with liberal media (r = 0.30) and mainstream print (r = 0.33). This 
confound was less likely for social media (r = 0.06), use of aggregators 
(r = 0.12), and mainstream TV (r = 0.17). 
In the case of vaccination (Fig. 2), perceived threat to the respondent 
and the nation remained as mediators of the relation between conspiracy 
beliefs and vaccine intention in March. However, the belief that the 
MMR vaccine is harmful was a strong mediator of the relation between 
conspiracy beliefs and vaccine intention and resulted in a somewhat 
stronger total relation between conspiracy beliefs and vaccination 
intention than for actions taken (− 0.19 vs. − 0.16 in standardized units). 
Change in vaccine intention in July was predicted by conspiracy beliefs 
both directly, − 0.15, 99% CI (− 0.25, − 0.06), and indirectly as mediated 
by MMR harm, − 0.033, 95% CI (− 0.072, − 0.003). The total effect of 
conspiracy beliefs on vaccine intentions in July including carry-over 
from March was substantial, − 0.29, 99% CI (− 0.37, − 0.22). Thus, the 
relationship between conspiracy beliefs and vaccination intention in 
July more than doubled from its carryover in March (− .11 to − 0.29). 
Reliance on mainstream TV was a positive predictor of vaccination in 
July. There was also a positive relation between reliance on social media 
and perceptions of MMR harm (Table 4), while education and White 
identity were negatively related to harm. 
The ability of conspiracy beliefs to predict change in each outcome 
was robust to controls for demographic differences and news use. In 
each case, the prediction remained despite controls for variables that 
were related to both outcomes and conspiracy beliefs (e.g., age, main-
stream TV, and ideology). Both models provided good fits to data, with 
small values of RMSEA (0.033 and 0.044) and high values of CFI (0.97, 
0.96) and TLI (0.94, 0.92). We also tested actions taken by treating it as a 
count variable, but again the results remained very much the same. 
4. Discussion 
Our results show that early in the pandemic in the US, COVID-related 
conspiracy beliefs were inversely related to both reporting taking pre-
ventive actions and intentions to vaccinate against the disease. In-
dividuals younger in age and lower in income and education were more 
likely to hold conspiracy beliefs about the origins and seriousness of the 
pandemic. Non-white respondents also were more likely to hold such 
beliefs. Since the likelihood of dying of COVID-19 increases with age 
(CDC, 2020b), the age finding is heartening. Since people of color are 
disproportionately dying of it (CDC, 2020c), the finding that they are 
more likely to hold conspiracy beliefs is worrisome. 
All of these relations are consistent with the suggestion that persons 
who feel politically powerless are more susceptible to conspiracy theo-
rizing (Crocker et al., 1999; Uscinski and Parent, 2014; Uscinski et al., 
2016). They also are more likely to accept statements from sources that 
question the legitimacy of the political system (Hahl et al., 2018; Har-
ambam and Aupers, 2015). These conspiratorial beliefs tend to attribute 
power to unseen actors who have interests that diverge from those of the 
average person. Although some have characterized conspiracy beliefs as 
aberrant (see review by Douglas et al., 2019) or reflective of paranoid 
thinking styles (Hofstadter, 2008), our findings suggest that they also 
are common enough to be problematic. 
Our results also show that conspiracy beliefs early in the pandemic 
continued to be related to subsequent behavior and intentions four 
months later. Mask wearing is increasingly seen as critical to controlling 
the spread of the coronavirus (Howard et al., 2020), and those holding 
conspiracy beliefs were less likely to engage in it even after health of-
ficials recommended it. Additionally, vaccination hesitancy increased 
since Wave 1, a finding that matches trends in other national surveys 
(Elflein, 2020; Romano, 2020). Here again, we found that the increase in 
hesitancy was predicted by earlier endorsement of conspiracy beliefs. 
These findings suggest that conspiracy beliefs play a causal role in 
reducing the embrace of public health recommendations to control the 
pandemic. 
The results also suggest that perceptions of the seriousness of the 
pandemic mediated the relation between conspiracy beliefs and mask- 
wearing, while perceptions of personal threat were only directly 
related to each outcome in Wave 1. It is also noteworthy that reliance on 
mainstream TV news was a positive predictor of change in both out-
comes, as well as negatively related to conspiracy beliefs and positively 
to both types of threat in March. These patterns suggest that mainstream 
TV news plays a larger role than other news media in emphasizing the 
importance of the pandemic’s threat and in not legitimizing COVID- 
related conspiracy theories. 
In distinction to the role played by mainstream TV news, reliance on 
conservative media was positively related to endorsing conspiracies and 
negatively related to perceptions of the national threat. This finding 
comports with the inverse relation we observed between liberal political 
ideology and COVID-related conspiracy beliefs. Use of liberal media was 
also positively related to seeing the pandemic as a national threat, 
consistent with national polls showing partisan differences in support 
for actions to prevent the spread of the infection (Allcott et al., 2020; 
Pew Research Center, 2020). It is perhaps fortunate that partisan dif-
ferences were less related to vaccination intentions than to taking action 
at either point. Neither political ideology nor conservative media reli-
ance was directly related to perceptions of MMR harm or vaccine in-
tentions. Nevertheless, these patterns suggest that the partisan cueing 
that has been apparent in the government and conservative media may 
be affecting the public’s response to the pandemic, as they have in 
previous health threats (Singer et al., 2020). 
The proportions who agree that the novel coronavirus was created by 
the Chinese government as a bioweapon or that some in the CDC are 
exaggerating the seriousness of the virus to undermine the Trump 
presidency are higher in this study than those reported by Jamieson and 
Albarracín (23% vs. 28% for China and 19% vs. 23% for CDC). A likely 
Table 4 
Standardized predictors of conspiracy beliefs, pandemic threats, and vaccine 










Liberal – .13 – – 
Conservative .22 -.10 – – 
Aggregators – – .07 .09* 
Social .08 – – .07* 
Mainstream Print -.14 – .09 – 
Education -.17 – – -.09 
Income -.06* – – – 
White Racial Identity -.13 – – -.08* 
Liberal Ideology -.19 .14 .11 – 
Note. Vaccine harm was tested in a separate model from action taken. All co-
efficients have confidence intervals of p ± .005 except for those at p ± .025 
marked by *. 
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reason is that, unlike ours, their respondents were given the option of 
saying they were “not sure” of the answer. Since it is unlikely that belief 
changed dramatically in the few weeks between their early March and 
our late March survey, the difference in response options probably ex-
plains the increased acceptance of the same conspiracy beliefs that we 
found. The higher proportions that reported acceptance here suggest 
that those who are unsure are more inclined to believe than not. Our 
proportions are also in line with those observed by Uscinski et al. (2020) 
who also did not allow a not-sure response, and the findings of Oliver 
and Wood (2014) who surveyed other conspiracy theories related to 
health outcomes. Nevertheless, identifying those who are unsure may be 
important because persuasion is more likely among those who have not 
yet made a firm commitment to a belief. 
The negative relation between conspiracy beliefs and taking pre-
ventive actions required to control the spread of COVID-19 poses chal-
lenges for public health. Persons holding conspiracy beliefs are likely to 
resist actions recommended by public health agents, such as the CDC 
(Nyhan and Reifler, 2015). They also are likely to turn down an eventual 
vaccine. The challenge for public health officials is compounded by the 
finding that anti-vaccine social media networks are highly inter-
connected and likely to influence others more so than are 
pro-vaccination networks, which are more peripheral and less connected 
with other networks (Johnson et al., 2020). Our findings regarding so-
cial media as a source of information related to conspiracy beliefs add to 
this concern. 
Although personal perceptions of threat mediated taking preventive 
action for both outcomes, conspiracy beliefs were more closely related to 
vaccination hesitancy through perceived MMR harms. Displacing worry 
about the harms of vaccination should be a goal of those encouraging the 
uptake of an eventual vaccine for the coronavirus. 
Prior research suggests that efforts to reduce conspiracy beliefs with 
information face significant obstacles, a phenomenon that may be 
related to their non-falsifiability (Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Uscinski, 
2017) and believers’ underlying distrust of elites who provide corrective 
information. Another reason for the robustness of conspiracy theories is 
the tolerance that those who hold them have for inconsistency (Douglas 
et al., 2019; Miller, 2020; Wood et al., 2012). For example, believing 
that the Chinese government created the virus is inconsistent with 
believing that the pharmaceutical industry was the originator. This 
pattern suggests that the relation between these beliefs is more of an “or” 
than an “and” one so that disputing one does not affect any other (Miller, 
2020). What underlies beliefs in the conspiracy theory space is an un-
derlying distrust of those in power (Crocker et al., 1999; Uscinski and 
Parent, 2014; Uscinski et al., 2016). 
Our analyses of media sources, as well as those of others (Motta et al., 
2020; Romano, 2020), suggest that conservative outlets which tend to 
support the President and social media that do not control the content on 
their sites (Gregory and McDonald, 2020) have been purveyors of con-
spiracy theories. Although Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram all began 
blocking COVID misinformation before our first survey (see Jamieson 
and Albarracín, 2020), we saw a slight increase in the level of conspiracy 
belief within our panelists between March and July. 
This study also exposes the cost of failing to interdict misinformed 
beliefs at their outset. Had the misbelief that the MMR vaccine can cause 
autism been dispatched when it emerged in 1998 (Eggertson, 2010), it 
would not be affecting the willingness to take the COVID-19 vaccine 
now. For this reason and because belief in the three conspiracy theories 
on which we focused here predicts resistance to both preventive be-
haviors and COVID-19 vaccination, it will be critical for the public 
health community to increase its messaging in mainstream media and, in 
particular, in conservative media outlets. State-of-the-science methods 
should be deployed to debunk or displace the conspiracy theories and 
vaccine fears identified here (see Lewandowsky et al., 2012). 
4.1. Limitations 
Our study has limitations. New conspiracies have emerged since we 
began this study; but as observed by Miller (2020), even those are highly 
related to the ones we assessed. At the same time, greater direct expe-
rience with the effects of the disease on friends and family may have 
made the threat of the pandemic to the country more real, something we 
did not reassess in July. Our measures of media use may be difficult to 
separate from personality differences, but we controlled for political 
ideology in all our analyses and the most robust predictor of change in 
outcomes, mainstream TV use, was not highly related to ideology. Our 
sample of 840 respondents may limit our ability to generalize to the 
entire US population. However, many of the patterns we observed in 
regard to conspiracy beliefs, media use, political ideology and vaccine 
acceptance were consistent with other national polls. Finally, our use of 
an online panel may also have reduced the representativeness of the 
sample, but our findings regarding the prevalence of conspiracy beliefs 
and their relation with media use were consistent with an earlier survey 
that was conducted by telephone (Jamieson and Albarracín, 2020). 
5. Conclusions 
Conspiracy beliefs regarding the coronavirus pandemic in the US 
were widespread and persistent over four months, more likely to be held 
by either persons with conservative political ideology or in disadvan-
taged racial-ethnic groups and more likely to be associated with use of 
conservative media outlets. Additionally, persons with non-White racial- 
ethnic identity and those using social media were more likely to believe 
that the MMR vaccine is harmful. Conspiracy beliefs and their associa-
tions with perceptions of vaccine harm present continuing challenges to 
the control of the coronavirus pandemic because of their persistence and 
association with non-acceptance of recommended action, especially 
mask-wearing, and increasing unwillingness to receive a vaccine when it 
becomes available. Confronting these conspiracy beliefs will require 
action by journalists and commentators, especially those with politically 
conservative audiences, to increase acceptance of medically recom-
mended actions to control the pandemic. 
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Appendix 
Media Battery (Rated on a 5-point scale ranging from No information to A 
lot of information) 
How much information do you get from sources such as Fox News, 
Rush Limbaugh, Breitbart News, One America News or The Drudge 
Report? 
How much information do you get from sources such as MSNBC, Bill 
Maher or the Huffington Post? 
How much information do you get from sources such as ABC News, 
CBS News or NBC News? 
How much information do you get from sources such as Google News 
or Yahoo News? 
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How much information do you get from sources such as Facebook, 
Twitter or YouTube? 
How much information do you get from sources such as the Associ-
ated Press, The New York Times, the Washington Post, or the Wall Street 
Journal? 
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